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Mechanisms and Emergence
A Reply to Denis C. Martin
Carl F. Craver
I respond to some of the major issues in Martin’s commentary, particularly (i) his
insistence on a robust notion of being “at” a level, and (ii) his desire for mechan-
istic emergence to explain the genuine ontological novelty of higher level phenom-
ena. 
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1 Introduction
The goal of my target essay is to articulate and
recommend a view about what one is and is not
committed to when one asserts that the domain
of  neuroscience  or  some  other  special  science
spans multiple levels of organization. How use-
ful one finds my specific recommendation—that
they be understood as levels of mechanisms—
will depend on the uses for which one deploys
the level metaphor. Martin raises a number of
questions about my unpacking of the metaphor
that help to clarify what is at stake in this dis-
cussion. 
2 The levels metaphor
First, a word about the idea that the term level
is used as a metaphor. According to the Oxford
English dictionary, the term “level” derives from
terms describing  the idea  of  being parallel  to
the ground. From there, the term could easily
extend  to  the  idea  that  a  building  can  have
multiple levels, or landings, from the ground up.
Something  like  this  spatial  arrangement  of
stacked landings seems to be the basis for many
applications  of  the  level  metaphor  (in  other
words, landings are the “secondary subject” of
the  metaphor).  Usage  of  the  term “level”  in-
creased  dramatically  in  the 20th Century,  and
surely some of this increase is explained by the
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fecundity of the metaphor for ordering items in
a  set  from  the  highest  to  the  lowest  (under
some  understandings  of  “high”  and  “low”).
These are the specific topics (the primary sub-
jects) to which the secondary subject (landings)
is compared. In asserting that the term “level”
has this metaphoric aspect, I do not intend to
thereby disqualify the metaphor from also ex-
pressing  a  set  of  true  or  false  commitments
about  the  structure  of  the  world.  Indeed,  I
think  that  the  mechanistic  application  of  the
metaphor more or less accurately describes the
structure of at least many systems in the do-
mains of the special sciences. 
My point  in being a pluralist  about the
levels metaphor is simply to emphasize that the
metaphor of a horizontal landing is used to de-
scribe  a  wide  variety  of  altogether  distinct
primary subjects. As a result, any understand-
ing of how this level metaphor works, what it is
committed to, and whether it works for a par-
ticular purpose, must begin with a clear under-
standing of  how the metaphor is  unpacked in
the given application.  (One cannot,  to  pick a
perfectly clear example, equate the great chain
of  being and levels of  mechanisms.)  A second
point was to emphasize that there are many le-
gitimate applications of the metaphor, and that
the utility of the metaphor might vary from one
application to the next. I am not arguing for a
single,  correct  way of  understanding  the level
metaphor.  However,  I  am  arguing  that  one
prominent use of the level metaphor in sciences
such as neuroscience can be usefully unpacked
as describing mechanistic levels. 
3 Being “at” a level
Martin  is  particularly  concerned  with  a)  the
idea that there should be a clear sense of what
it is to be “at” a level, and b) the idea there is
some significant sense in which being at a level
represents a genuine ontological novelty. 
The first of these concerns arises from the
fact that the placement question cannot be (or
has not been) given a satisfying answer within
the  mechanistic  application  of  the  metaphor.
The  mechanistic  account  of  levels  focuses,  as
Martin correctly notes, on what it means to be
at different levels of organization within a mech-
anism. Concerning what it means to be “at a
level,” one can say only that two things are “at”
the same level just in case they are not at dif-
ferent levels; if neither thing is a component en-
tity/activity in the behavior of the other, then
the two things are not at different mechanistic
levels and, in this weak sense, they are at the
same level. This provides a sort of answer to the
placement question, but not one that will sat-
isfy  those,  such  as  Martin,  who  hanker  after
some additional factor (such as size or similar-
ity) that unites the items at a level and that ex-
plains why all  such items are at that level.  I
take the failure to answer the placement ques-
tion as one of the key revisionary consequences
of thinking clearly about levels of mechanisms.
It  is  a  crucial  guide  to  understanding  what’s
misleading about the monolithic conception of
levels. 
One  apparent  problem  for  this  con-
sequence (the absence of a satisfying answer to
the  placement  question)  was  first  raised  by
Lindley Darden (personal communication): X’s
-ing might be a component in (and so at a lower
level than) S’s -ing, ψ and yet both X’s -ing and
S’s -ing might be at the same level as (i.e., notψ
at a different level than) some altogether dis-
tinct P’s ß-ing. There is a failure of transitivity.
This, it seems to me, is simply a consequence of
the idea that the application of the level meta-
phor to levels of mechanisms breaks down when
one is not talking about relations between parts
and wholes. This is unproblematic; it is simply
an alternative way of expressing the idea that
being  “at  the  same level”  is  of  no  additional
metaphysical significance within the mechanistic
application of the metaphor than simply not be-
ing  at  different  levels.  This  does  not  prevent
one, of course, from using some other ordering
criterion for this expressive purpose; one might
lump things together on the basis of their sizes
or perhaps the instruments used to detect them.
But one should be aware that at this point one
has left the mechanistic application of the meta-
phor. 
Another  consequence  of  the  mechanistic
view is that one might equally correctly carve
the boundaries of mechanisms in any number of
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ways (see e.g.,  Craver 2004,  2009,  2012). If so,
there will not be a uniquely correct answer to
the question of how many levels a given mech-
anism  has.  Our  decisions  to  privilege  some
grains in the decomposition of a mechanism as
an appropriate place to locate a level depends
on our techniques,  our theoretical  background
assumptions,  our  characterization  of  the  phe-
nomenon,  our representational  tools,  and per-
haps certain features of human psychology. As
Simon argued, these systems are only nearly de-
composable;  how a system is  decomposed de-
pends, for example, on the relative strength of
intra-  versus  extra-system  causal  interactions
that one takes to be appropriate for carving the
system at its near-joints. This is another reason
I am hesitant to pin too much on the idea of be-
ing “at” a level.
4 Ontological novelty and emergence
I  am not  hostile  to  the second idea (b)  that
levels of mechanisms exhibit a kind of ontolo-
gical novelty, depending on how this novelty is
understood  and  how  one  thinks  that  it  is
achieved. I suggest in the target article that a
mechanism as a whole can do things that its
parts  (taken  individually)  cannot  do.  Lawn-
mowers mow grass; spark plugs do not. But I
also claim that a mechanism as a whole cannot
do  things  that  its  organized  and  interacting
parts cannot do. This is because the behavior of
a mechanism as a whole just is (or at least is
ontologically intimate with) the organized inter-
action of its component parts. I don’t know how
to  make  the  notion  of  “ontological  intimacy”
precise here (though the behavior of a mechan-
ism in context will surely supervene on the or-
ganized collection of interacting components in
that context). In my hands, “ontological intim-
acy,” is meant to denote an exhaustive ontolo-
gical grounding of the behavior of a mechanism
as a whole in the organized interactions of its
components in a given causal context, however
that is properly to be unpacked. Everything has
an ontic explanation in terms of the organized
activities of the mechanism’s parts.
The term emergence strikes me as suspi-
cious, and I hesitate to use it even in the con-
text of levels of mechanisms, precisely because
it suggests a severing of this ontological intim-
acy, a slide from the banal fact that mechan-
isms behave as they do because they are organ-
ized  arrangements  of  interacting  parts  to  the
ontologically  esoteric  thought  that  something
comes into being with causal powers ontologic-
ally inexplicable in terms of the organized inter-
actions of the parts. Such claims about ontolo-
gical novelty are almost always accompanied by
claims that emergent things have a “downward”
causal influence. I have labored to drive a wedge
between levels of mechanisms and such ideas. 
This connects with Martin’s description of
Thompson’s  view.  According  to  Martin,
Thompson requires that the parts in a system
must be coupled and dynamically interacting to
produce emergent properties and, further, that
the properties of the whole should act “down-
ward”  on  the  dynamics  of  the  components
(2007). Take these in turn. 
The idea of levels of mechanisms, by itself,
requires only that the parts be organized and
interact with one another; it does not require
that  the  components  interact  non-linearly.
Mechanisms with components that interact non-
linearly are a subset of mechanisms more gener-
ally. It should not make any difference with re-
spect  to the  novelty of  higher-level  properties
that  the  parts  interact  non-linearly.  Such  dy-
namical interactions might make the behavior of
the whole harder to predict on the basis of our
understanding of the parts; but this is an epi-
stemic, not an ontological,  observation irrelev-
ant to the ontological question to which I am
responding.  To  be  ontologically  novel  is  not
merely to be surprising. 
Perhaps  systems  with  dynamically  inter-
acting components are  harder  to idealize  into
separable  interacting  components;  again,  this
would  appear  to  be  an  epistemic  issue.
Thompson, at least in Martin’s description, is
drawing a more fine-grained distinction than I
draw. This is perhaps a terminological matter.
The  pressing  question  between  us  is  whether
non-linearity  (or  perhaps  some  other  form of
complexity) makes any ontological difference to
the kind of thing that “emerges” from the “or-
ganized interactions” of the parts. I’m inclined
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to say no, but a full consideration of the issue
would require a more detailed treatment than I
can give it here. 
Thompson also  requires  that  the  higher-
level phenomenon should have “determinative”
influence on things at lower-levels. “Determinat-
ive” surely cannot mean the existence of a uni-
versally quantified material conditional with the
behavior of the mechanism as a whole as the
antecedent  and  the  organized  interactions
among the components as the consequent. Mul-
tiple realization precludes such an analysis. But
“determinative”  also  cannot  be  understood in
the  causally  productive  sense  in  which  some-
thing (such as charge or momentum) is passed
from whole to part. And for reasons expressed
in  the  target  article,  there  are  many  widely
shared assumptions about the independence of
causes and effects that stand in the way of un-
derstanding such top-down relations  in  causal
terms. This is why I suggest (as in  Craver &
Bechtel 2007) that  the language of  downward
causation is misleading in the context of token
mechanisms. We recommend that claims about
downward causation are really shorthand ways
of  expressing  an  often  complex  web  of  con-
stitutive (about relations between things at dif-
ferent levels of mechanisms and levels of realiza-
tion) and causal claims (about things that are
not at different levels from one another) about
the system. However this is to be cashed out,
the term “determinative” seems misleading. 
5 Levels and techniques
Finally, I’ll offer a brief remark concerning Mar-
tin’s positive suggestion for reifying levels. Mar-
tin’s central idea—that we often pick out things
as being on a level because they are detectable
with the same or a similar kind of apparatus or
with the same or a similar set of procedures—
seems to me correct and important. Among the
many possible  ways  of  decomposing  a  spatio-
temporal whole into component parts, some of
these correspond to items that for one reason or
another are readily detectable as such by one or
more experimental apparatus. This way of put-
ting  things  highlights  how  pragmatic  factors,
such as available apparatus, determine what we
will  take to be an appropriate “landing” in a
hierarchy  of  levels.  And it  raises  useful  ques-
tions about, for example, when two different ap-
paratus, or two different tasks, or two different
procedures  in  fact  target  the  same  items,  or
items at the same level. On a fine-grained char-
acterization of our experimental instruments, no
two  experiments  are  the  same.  On  a  course
grain,  even  superficially  quite  distinct  experi-
ments can be targeting the same phenomenon
(consider, e.g., implicit bias or spatial memory).
As noted above, it seems to me that many other
epistemic, theoretical, and psychological factors
enter into these decisions as well.
This good point, however, is obscured by
an  ontology  in  which  properties  apparently
come  into  existence  during  acts  of  detection.
Martin’s view is that objects  have disposition
profiles, and these profiles are turned into prop-
erties when they are measured. It is unclear to
me, however, why one would not want to say
that  properties  are  there  to  be  detected  all
along, or perhaps that properties just are the
dispositional profiles of things.  Martin doesn’t
do much to motivate this experimental idealism
about properties, but the thought seems hard to
motivate, at least for macroscopic phenomena.
It is  an apparent consequence of  Martin’s ac-
count that levels don’t exist until they are de-
tected. And it is an apparent consequence of his
view that new levels come into existence when
we  develop  new  instruments  to  detect  them.
And, to reiterate the thought in the last para-
graph, we will have to wrestle with the question
of when two techniques detect the same thing
or  different  things.  Martin’s  positive  proposal
makes this question much more pressing, given
that,  for  Martin’s  view,  the  structure  of  the
world– specifically, the distribution of properties
in space and time– apparently hangs in the bal-
ance.  But  if  we  abandon  the  idea  that  the
placement question must have a uniquely cor-
rect answer, these questions are less pressing for
thinking about ontology; nonetheless, questions
about how we coordinate different experimental
tasks,  protocols,  and  procedures  are  at  the
heart of the epistemological challenge faced by
any experimentalist (see Sullivan 2009, 2010).
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